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5 posts tagged with "mev-boost"

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EIP-8375's two one-third burns overlap by 36%

· 6 min read
Aubury Essentian
Ethereum Research

EIP-8375 proposes two one-third burns. It burns one third of transaction priority fees in every payload, and it sets an external builder's auction target to one third of the signed gross bid. That sounds additive. It is not.

In a fixed signed-number backcast across 89,994 canonical MEV-Boost blocks, the two standalone amounts were 408.394 ETH and 326.692 ETH. Adding them gives 735.086 ETH, but the draft's actual credit rule burns 469.829 ETH. The missing 265.257 ETH is overlap, equal to 36.1% of the naive sum.

Who Actually Wins the Premium MEV Blocks?

· 4 min read
Aubury Essentian
Ethereum Research

Block builder win rate is the number everyone tracks. Builder X won 18% of blocks last week. Builder Y's market share is up. But win rate hides something: most of those blocks are worth almost nothing. The real competition isn't for volume. It's for the blocks worth 0.05, 0.2, even 1 ETH in builder payments — the slots that account for a disproportionate share of all MEV value.

Looking at seven days of mainnet MEV-Boost data (~45,000 deduplicated slots), two completely different builder ecosystems are visible.

The Three Waves: How Ethereum Validators Choose When to Publish Blocks

· 5 min read
Aubury Essentian
Ethereum Research

Correction, 2026-08-13: I grouped a per-observer timing table into 200ms buckets, ran count(), and called the result slots. The old histogram therefore counted 7,438,781 observer rows, roughly 148 rows per corrected block, even though only 50,400 slots physically fit in the seven-day window. Rebuilding from exact canonical block roots at one-block-per-slot grain gives 32,694 / 11,502 / 6,006 blocks in Waves 1/2/3. The three waves and the Wave 2 versus Wave 3 accuracy cliff survive; the old y-axis, ~73,000-slot claim, 10,945 Wave 2 count, and 28× penalty ratio do not. Full correction and queries.

When a validator is chosen to propose a block, it has a choice: publish the moment the block is ready, or wait for MEV-Boost bids to arrive and raise the payout. Most discussions frame this as a binary — you either participate in the timing game or you don't.

The data says it's more complicated. There are three distinct groups, and the middle one has mostly gone unnoticed.